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Conclusion: The Future of Parliamentary Politics 
David Judge, Cristina Leston-Bandeira and Louise Thompson  
 
Political scientists have a mixed record in predicting the political future; and so, as political 
scientists, we won’t engage in expansive ‘futurology’ and ‘guestimates’ about the future of 
Parliament in this chapter. Instead, in exploring the future of parliamentary politics, we will 
invoke the words often attributed to Albert Einstein: ‘The future is an unknown, but a somewhat 
predictable unknown. To look to the future we must first look back upon the past’. If we can 
identify what parliament was and is, and what it did and still does – which has been the central 
connecting thread interwoven in the preceding chapters – then we can provide a basis for 
exploring what we might expect parliament to be and do in the future. Individually, the 31 
chapters of this book have explored what parliament does and why it does what it does. 
Collectively, these chapters provide an overarching assessment of the contemporary 
significance of the UK parliament in the UK’s political system by revealing what it ‘is’ as an 
institution. Whilst it is not our intention to reprise the analyses of earlier chapters; it is our 
intention, however, to identify key puzzles implicit within these analyses which raise 
fundamental questions about what parliament is and why it exists. In turn, this will help us to 
identify the ‘predictable unknowns’ as starting points for the exploration of the future.  
 
‘Predictable unknowns’: Puzzles and functions 
Gerhard Loewenberg, one of the preeminent analysts of parliaments in modern times, has 
argued that ‘legislatures are puzzling institutions’ inasmuch as they ‘are unlike other political 
institutions’ (2011:1). In making this case he maintains that there are three principal puzzles 
that need ‘hard thinking’ in order to understand legislatures: representation; collective decision 
making (in terms of internal organization and procedure); and their role in the political system 
(as connectors between government and the public). In identifying these three primary 
puzzles, Loewenberg echoes a set of three key functions, ascribed earlier by Copeland and 
Patterson (1994), to legislatures – linkage, decision making and legitimation. The importance 
of these inter-linked functions is elemental ‘because a parliament’s very reason for existence 
is found in them’, and changes in claims surrounding these institutional functions ‘go to the 
heart of [their] role in a political system’ (Copeland and Patterson 1994:154). To understand 
the possible futures of parliament we need, therefore, to understand the past puzzles and 
associated functions that have defined parliament as an institution (what it is) and its roles 
within the wider political system (what it does), and to use these to structure our discussion of 
the ‘predictable unknowns’ facing the UK parliament. 
 
Thinking hard about Representation and Linkage 
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The ‘who’, ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions 
The chapters in Part 4 outlined the contemporary significance of representation in parliament 
and the changing emphases and tensions observable in answering the ‘who’, ‘what’ and how’ 
questions of representation. The ‘who’ question focuses attention upon the similarity (or 
otherwise) of social characteristics between represented and their representatives, and has 
increasingly found an answer in calls to enhance ‘descriptive representation’. At the heart of 
a definition of descriptive representation is the idea of ‘shared experiences’ whereby 
representatives are ‘in some sense typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent’ 
(Mansbridge 1999:644). Historically the ‘shared experience’ of greatest significance in most 
representative democracies, and certainly in the UK, has been locality. The contemporary 
significance of geographic location has been visible in voters’ preferences for local candidates 
as well as in constituency activity by their MPs, and in the work patterns of MPs in 
Westminster. The impact of geographical differences, and voters’ ‘shared experiences’ 
associated with those differences, was clearly evident in the responses of MPs to Brexit in 
Westminster. The 2016 EU referendum, exposed deep geographical divisions between leave 
and remain supporters in disparate parliamentary constituencies. These geographical 
differences, and voters’ ‘shared experiences’ associated with those differences, will 
undoubtedly continue to drive debate in Westminster, and determine the votes of MPs, during 
the course of the implementation of Brexit. The importance of these ‘shared interests’, whether 
conceived in terms of ‘forgotten’ geographical areas or of ‘left behind’ social groups, is that 
demands for parliament to reflect more closely those interests and opinions will be amplified 
more forcefully in the Brexit and post-Brexit context. In the immediate future, the cross-cutting 
pressures upon representatives whose personal referendum voting preferences are 
diametrically opposed to those of the vast majority of their constituents (most notably for 
Labour MPs) will reveal, dramatically, the complexities of the linkage relationship between the 
represented and their representatives. 
 
If Brexit has reinserted the claims of the ‘left behind’ into the normative case for descriptive 
representation, the claims of women and ethnic minorities – the most forceful claims of the 
recent past – will continue to dominate demands for parliament to be more like the society 
from which its members are drawn. Despite the 2017 general election returning the ‘most 
diverse parliament yet’ (BBC News 11 June 2017) campaigners for a more socially 
representative parliament continued to argue that much still remained to be done in the future. 
This argument had been amplified by the House of Commons’ Women and Equalities 
Committee which recommended that the government set a domestic target of 45 per cent 
representation of women in Parliament by 2030 (HC 630 2017:11). The committee was in ‘no 
doubt that a representative and diverse House of Commons is beneficial to the effective 
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functioning of parliamentary democracy’ (2017:34). Equally, it was in no doubt that 
parliamentary effectiveness would be enhanced by ‘fair representation of many different 
groups of people, including women, ethnic and religious minorities, lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender people, people from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, disabled people and 
more’ (2017:34). But advocacy of ‘fair representation’ for multiple diverse groups brings with 
it future problems of ‘intersectionality’, and how to deal, both conceptually and practically, with 
the multidimensionality of social group identities (see Severs et al. 2016, Evans 2016).  
 
On the specific issue of ensuring more social diversity within Westminster, political parties 
have had the primary responsibility in the past and have been charged to ‘bear the lion’s share 
of responsibility’ in the future (HC 630 2017:34, see chapter 21). On the more general issue 
of ‘what’ is being represented, political parties will also be expected to perform a key future 
role in the ‘representation of ideas’. Indeed, the primary representational focus of political 
parties in Westminster, both in the past as well as in the present, has been the ‘politics of 
ideas’, which assumes a ‘shared ideology’ or ‘same political viewpoint’ between represented 
and representative. However, the simplicities of electoral competition between two dominant 
class-based parties, and of the internal cohesion within those parties in the Commons, is a 
thing of the past. As shown in chapter 23, and amplified in political events in the post-Brexit 
referendum era, internal ideological cohesion within parliamentary parties – and between MPs 
and wider party members and supporters – has been ‘stress-tested’ to its further limits by 
significant and reinforcing ideological fissures. 
 
These splits, in turn, have impacted upon the ‘how’ of representation. How a representative in 
parliament should act has typically been conceived in terms of a continuum defined by the 
polar positions of ‘trustee’ and ‘delegate’. Whereas representatives and represented alike 
recognise the logic of delegation implicit in party support when MPs make their voting 
decisions in Westminster, this logic may be cross-cut in practice by alternative ‘delegation’ 
demands emanating from an MP’s constituency, or a counter-posed logic of ‘trusteeship’ 
where MPs privilege their personal consciences, or their own interpretations of a wider 
national interest, above the sectional interests of party or locality. These cross-cutting 
representational forces were manifest in many MPs’ speeches in the debate on the European 
Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill in January 2017 (see for example HC Debates 31 
January 2017 vol. 620: cols 830-2; 890; 928; 981). These cross-pressures will undoubtedly 
continue to manifest themselves in future debates about Brexit (both as process and as 
policy). 
 
Amplifying the voice of the people in the representative process 
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If representational linkage is likely to be more descriptive and inclusive in the future it is also 
more likely to be less, or un-, mediated. Whilst they clearly play an instrumental part in 
representative democracy, parties and representatives’ key role as mediators between people 
and governance has increasingly been questioned. This has happened simultaneously 
through declining levels of trust in political institutions and the rise of new forms of democracy, 
namely direct, advocacy and participatory democracy which often sit uneasily alongside 
representative democracy. Whereas a standard model of representative democracy largely 
assigns a passive role to voters between elections, increasingly this model has been modified 
by participatory expectations on the part of the public, whereby citizens seek to be consulted 
between elections, contribute to setting the political agenda, make their own representations 
and inputs in the decision-making process, and monitor closely the activities of 
parliamentarians. These expectations have been recognised in the Westminster parliament’s 
prioritisation of enabling the public ‘to engage constructively and to have an input into 
parliamentary processes’ (House of Commons Service 2015:35). The chapters in Part V have 
examined the extent to which this commitment has guided contemporary practice, but here 
we extrapolate recent trends into the near future.  
 
The difficulties in reconciling ideas about popular sovereignty and direct public participation 
with notions of parliamentary sovereignty and indirect public participation in decision-making 
were made apparent, starkly, by the 2016 EU referendum and its aftermath. As a result, 
parliamentarians have become more risk-averse towards future UK-wide referendums (see 
Ipsos MORI 2017). Less dramatically, the tension between the inclusion of the people and 
their exclusion – inherent within the very concept of representative democracy (see Judge 
2014) – has been manifest in the development of the UK parliament’s e-petition system. The 
creation of the Petitions Committee in 2015 led to innovative and creative public engagement 
initiatives and resulted in immediate and notable impacts upon the public policy agenda (most 
notably in the brain tumour and the dress code petitions). The ‘inclusionary’ success of the 
new e-petitions system, measured by the submission of 30,247 e-petitions within only 20 
months of the e-petitions website going live, was, however, offset by the practical 
organisational ‘exclusionary’ restrictions, measured by the small proportion achieving the 
necessary thresholds for a government response (445) or for a debate in parliament (55). 
More tellingly, fully 65 per cent of e-petitions were rejected in this period. As revealed in 
chapter 29, the current challenges in dealing with such high volumes of petitions are clear. In 
the immediate future, parliament will be required to address the questions already posed by 
these challenges: How to accommodate such high demand? How to distinguish between what 
is prudent and what is popular? How to manage public expectations? Future answers to these 
questions will require serious thought about how the UK Parliament can fulfil its (inclusionary) 
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commitment to openness, engagement and accessibility while addressing the practical 
(exclusionary) considerations of internal organisational efficacy, efficiency of in-house 
decision processes, and fulfilment of a broader civic responsibility for decision making (in the 
sense of occupying an institutional space shielded from populist vagaries).  
 
The tension posed by the inclusion-exclusion paradox of parliamentary democracy has also 
been a feature of other e-participatory initiatives at Westminster. Inclusionary intent has been 
apparent in: the crowdsourcing of questions for select committee scrutiny sessions; the 
experiment with crowdsourcing of questions to be asked at PMQs; more structured e-
consultation exercises undertaken by parliamentary committees; alongside e-consultation 
exercises trialled by individual MPs with their constituents; and e-monitoring platforms. Yet, 
current concerns about the capture of such initiatives – by organised publics (for example 
professional lobby groups, cyber-groups constituted in social media echo silos) at the expense 
of unorganised publics and technologically voiceless publics (captured in the term ‘digital 
divide’); by unmediated clicktivism; by hacktivists; and by unaccountable, often secretive, 
corporations; and by the pedlars of ‘fake news’ – hold the potential to be magnified in the 
future as the scope and penetration of digital technologies expand exponentially. 
 
Parliament has, of course, sought to respond to challenges of the ever-changing digital world. 
In 2015, the Digital Democracy Commission set a target, that ‘by 2020 Parliament should be 
fully active and digital’, which had clear inclusionary intents of enabling the public to contribute 
to the law-making process, ‘to have their say’ in House of Commons debates, and of engaging 
people through ‘an issue-based approach’. But the Commission’s report was seen ‘as the start 
of a conversation, not the end’ (2015:75). A key part of this future conversation will reflect the 
tensions between inclusion and exclusion, between participation (input) and decision-making 
(output), and between the articulation and promotion of specific, often sectional interests, and 
the filtering and assessment of those interests against wider collective ideas about the public 
interest and the national interest. To-date parliament has claimed an exclusive ability to 
determine and weigh the latter against the former. Yet, this distinctive ability may yet come to 
be challenged in the future by emerging technologies and algorithms which enable large 
volumes of citizen-generated text and speech patterns to be summarised, and, on this basis, 
for the strength of public opinion on key issues to be estimated.  
 
Thinking hard about collective decision making  
One of the key puzzles of parliaments identified by Loewenberg (2011:49) is that the ‘equal 
status of each member of a legislature presents a fundamental challenge to its capacity to 
reach collective decisions’. According to him, the only way to resolve this puzzle is for 
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legislatures to accept ‘an implicit hierarchy, which entails delegating authority to committees, 
party groups and to leaders’ (2011:59). The chapters in Parts II and III have examined how 
this delegation works in the contemporary practice of Westminster. What we aim to do here, 
however, is to project some of the key recent organisational and procedural developments 
into the future and so identify some of the ‘predictable unknowns’.  
 
What is predictable is that, just as with the puzzle of representation, technologically-assisted 
engagement and inclusion programmes will be a predominant feature of future thinking about 
law making, scrutiny and accountability processes in Westminster. What is predictable, 
equally, is that parliamentary decision making processes will continue to be dominated by 
leadership hierarchies built upon interlocked government and party positions. What is less 
predictable however, after the 2017 general election, is the extent to which pre-existing 
parliamentary norms associated with executive dominance – based upon resilient 
parliamentary majorities – and procedural devices, which despite reforms such as the 
backbench business committee, had privileged the executive, will be modulated in the near 
future as a minority government (underpinned by a third party) tests its capacity to secure the 
passage of it legislative programme through parliament. In these circumstances the Commons 
and the Lords will remain, to use Mezey’s (1979:47) categorisation, ‘reactive’. In this reactive 
position, they will set the parameters of government action through a capacity to modify, delay 
and deliberate upon such action, but will normally be unable to veto such action (although a 
‘hung parliament’ makes party management more precarious and ‘normal’ government 
majorities less certain). Nonetheless, even in the ‘normal circumstances’ of executive 
majorities of recent decades, the capacity to modify and exert influence over government 
policies should not be underestimated. Indeed, even before 2017, there was growing research 
evidence that parliament’s specific impact upon legislative outputs and, more generally, its 
scrutiny of government activity through the select committee system, had increased in recent 
decades (see Russell and Cowley 2015; Russell and Gover 2017). 
 
Parliament’s increased influence reflects both attitudinal change and procedural and 
organisational change (as examined in the chapters in Parts II and III). The essence of these 
changes has been to challenge what Thompson (2015:66) has called the ‘culture of 
resistance’ embedded in government to parliamentary amendment of its legislation, or what 
others have called an ‘executive mentality’ which privileges power hoarding in the hands of 
ministers in decision-making more generally (see Judge 1993:143; Flinders 2002:30; Kelso 
2009:19). This challenge to executive dominance has also been evident in some of the public 
engagement strategies outlined in Part 5. 
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Modern legislation may be complex and increasing in volume, but notable steps have been 
taken to make it more comprehensible to those beyond parliament. In recent years, parliament 
has modernised its online provision of legislative documents. A recognition of the need for 
user-friendly language and for the provision of explanatory statements alongside amendments 
to bills has provided a partial antidote to the almost impenetrable procedural and linguistic 
obscurities of the past. The House of Commons has piloted a ‘public reading stage’, building 
on previous government consultations on legislation, to encourage citizens to add comments 
and suggestions to a legislative text (see Leston-Bandeira and Thompson 2017). Select 
committees have been empowered to conduct pre-legislative scrutiny, on the premise that 
governments are more likely to make concessions to parliament before the formal introduction 
of a bill at Westminster. The Liaison Committee (HC 954 2015:25) has identified the merits of 
this system, and have argued that, in the future, ‘there is scope to go further and that the 
benefits of pre-legislative scrutiny in terms of improving the quality of legislation which reaches 
the statute book and in easing the passage or controversial, technical and complex bills’. Yet, 
there are limits to expanding this scope. Thus, for example, in March 2017 David Davis (Brexit 
Secretary) made it absolutely clear that the vastly politically contentious Great Repeal Bill 
would not be subject to pre-legislative scrutiny’ (HC Debates 30 March 2017: col 435); a 
position confirmed after the general election of 2017. 
 
Indeed, the enormity of the legislative task of disentangling UK law from EU law in the wake 
of Brexit, threatens to overwhelm parliament’s recent strengthened scrutiny capacity. The 
immediate future will be dominated not only by fundamental political debates about the 
meaning of Brexit and its economic, social and constitutional consequences, but also by 
parallel procedural debates about the what and how of legislative scrutiny. In particular, future 
generations of students of parliament will be obliged to pay far more attention to the 
procedures for the scrutiny of, what is variously called, delegated legislation, statutory 
instruments, subordinate legislation, or what is often referred to as Henry VIII clauses. In so 
doing, the historic problems associated with the parliamentary scrutiny of secondary 
legislation will be highlighted; and the significant ‘constitutional risks’, arising from the wide 
discretionary powers afforded to governments by the use of such legislation will have to be 
mitigated (HL 123 2017). 
 
Simultaneously, the ‘repatriation’ of legislative powers by Westminster will also re-energise 
territorial pressures for regional or national solutions to the problems of collective decision 
making in the UK. Since late 2015 there has been provision – through the operation of English 
Votes for English Laws (EVEL) – for English, or sometimes English and Welsh, or even 
English and Welsh and Northern Irish MPs only, to consider certain bills (or parts of bills) that 
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apply in their part of the UK. The complexities and opacity of the procedure have generated 
much criticism. Indeed, just before the 2017 general election, Gover and Kenny (2017) in 
‘looking to the future’ (of a then Conservative majority government) voiced ‘serious concerns’ 
that the additional legislative burden that Brexit will place on parliament might call into question 
key features of EVEL. One of which was the possibility that Brexit ‘could well bring to the 
surface new tensions and disagreements within the Conservative Party, and the EVEL 
procedures may become an additional site where such conflicts are played out’. These 
concerns were only magnified after the 2017 election when the reduction in the number of 
Conservative MPs in England and Wales simultaneously increased the need for even more 
judicious internal party management within designated EVEL procedures, as well as 
increasing the dependence of the government on non-English MPs to secure successful 
passage of ‘English only’ Bills at the later stages of the legislative process (where a majority 
of UK MPs is required). In a world of ‘hung parliaments’ (potentially short-term), and in a post-
Article 50 world (stretching far into the long-term), the exact future of collective decision-
making at Westminster is a realm of ‘unknowns’, but there are certain ‘predictabilities’ that 
may be used to make sense of those ‘unknowns’.  
 
 
Thinking hard about legitimation 
Historically, the UK parliament has fused the core principles of representation, consent and 
authorisation into the legitimation of state policy making processes and their outputs. The 
notion of parliamentary legitimation has been central to the exercise of public power by the 
UK state. Over time the foundational legitimation claims of the modern state have come to be 
associated with democratic authorisation and accountability afforded by election. Moreover, 
Westminster, as seen in Part 1, has served symbolically, through its rituals and architecture, 
as the epicentre of the state and the collective embodiment of its constituent nations. This 
centrality has been ossified in ‘the fundamental principle of the UK constitution’ of 
parliamentary sovereignty (Cm 9417 2017:13). A principle that has been at the heart of historic 
constitutional battles between parliament, political executives and the judiciary, and continues 
to drive constitutional contestation over the issues of the UK state’s relationship with the EU, 
with its own sub-nations, with the popular will of its people as articulated through referendums, 
and with the use of the judiciary’s interpretive powers. 
 
Just as the unfettered scope of parliamentary sovereignty has been a continuing feature of 
official discourse, so too have the practical constraints upon that convention been routinely 
revealed in the practice of UK governance. These constraints were apparent in the decision, 
of February 2017, to trigger Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union and so serve notice 
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of the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU. For all that the principle of the legal supremacy 
of parliament was reasserted by the Supreme Court in 2017, in its majority judgement that an 
Act of Parliament was required to authorise ministers to trigger Article 50, the practical 
supremacy of the government (exercised through its control of conjoined party and executive 
hierarchies in Westminster) was evident throughout the passage of the Brexit legislation. In 
practice, therefore, the theoretical sovereignty of parliament rapidly transmogrifies into the 
daily routines of, what Griffith (1982:14) revealingly called, executive sovereignty. Indeed, 
Dicey, the 19th century academic jurist widely credited with popularising the notion of 
parliamentary sovereignty, was well aware that, even by the beginning of the 20th century, the 
‘power of passing any bill whatever’ had passed to the ‘House of Commons, or, in plain 
language, to the majority thereof’ (Dicey [1915] 1982:xli emphasis added). In which case, he 
maintained that parliamentary government in the UK ‘means a very vicious form of 
government by party’ ([1894] cited in Cosgrove 1980:107).  
 
In the 21st century, the prescriptions of a legislature-centred mode of decision making intrinsic 
within the notion of parliamentary sovereignty continue to be used by governments to justify 
the practices of executive-centred decision making. In looking to the past, this incongruity has 
been one of the fundamental ‘predictabilities’ of parliamentary politics. In looking to the future, 
the predictabilities of the past help us to formulate ‘predictable unknowns’. Hence, predictably, 
governments will continue to legitimise their actions through specific claims to parliamentary 
authorisation and consent, and through general claims to permissive consent stemming from 
electoral processes and mandates. The ‘unknowns’ arise, however, in the short-term at least 
after June 2017, from the uncertain durability of a minority government (dependent on a 
‘confidence and supply’ agreement with a peripheral party) and the extent to which adversarial 
and partisan norms in the Commons are permeated, in the absence of clear electoral 
mandates, by more consensual and more porous policy accommodations in the face domestic, 
UK, political fluidity and external, EU, negotiating rigidity. In the longer-term, ‘unknowns’ may 
be more predictable and arise, first, from the potential restitution of executive ascendency – 
asserted by a dominant governing party or parties in parliament (memorably termed ‘elective 
dictatorship’ by Lord Hailsham (1978)) – and the extent to which such a return to ‘normality’ 
would undermine the very legitimation rooted in the historic principles of consequential 
parliamentary authorisation and consent. Second, from the sustaining of parliamentary 
opposition to such ascendency in an era of party reconstitution (with multi-party and intra-
party dimensions). Third, from the degree of erosion to the unifying ideology of Westminster 
sovereignty powered by nationalist aspirations of sub-state parliaments and governments and 
their responses to Brexit. Fourth, from the challenges posed by the amplification of populist 
claims of ‘popular sovereignty’. Fifth, from the advancement of ‘non-electoral’ representative 
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claims; and, sixth, from the expansion of ‘democratic innovations’ beyond parliament driven 
by ideas of direct, unmediated democratic participation and sustained by exponential 
technological development. 
 
While we make no pretence of knowing the future, we are convinced, along with all the authors 
of the chapters in this book, that an understanding of parliament – of its functions, roles, 
puzzles and limitations – is vital to the vibrancy of democracy in the UK. Exploring Parliament 
has provided a guide through what, for many readers, has been unfamiliar political terrain. 
Future exploration, to return to the words attributed to Einstein, will prospect the unknown; but, 
with an understanding of parliament’s past and present, this should be an exploration of ‘the 
somewhat predictable unknown’. We wish you an enlightened journey into the parliamentary 
future. 
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